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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would
have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product,
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Generally known as a subsequent remedial measure (SRM), in
the products liability context, the rule is invoked where a change is
made to a line of products after an accident occurs involving an existing product of a similar type. Less often the rule is asserted
where a product is recalled after an accident. Some courts have
also interpreted the rule to bar evidence of product line changes
implemented before an accident occurs in an existing product.
In the past couple of decades, the rule and its state counterparts have been criticized for ambiguous language,' reliance on
1. "Unclear" means that a manufacturer has difficulty determining which
jurisdictions it will be sued in and at what rate they will be sued in admitjurisdictions versus exclude-jurisdictions. First, the manufacturer would determine
the increased Pj for those jurisdictions where SRM evidence is admitted. Second, it
would have to take into account the number of cases expected to be filed in admit
jurisdictions (Pja) and the number expected to be filed in exclude jurisdictions(Pje) with some additional estimation for those jurisdictions where admission/exclusion is unclear (Pju) and ultimately combine these figures into a total Pj
(as expressed in Figure 7) .
2.

E.g., EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 57 (2d

ed. David A. Schlueter ed., 1991); Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal
Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "PlainMeaning"Jurisprudence, the
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestionsfor Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 894 (1992).
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bad social policy,3 and non-uniform application. 4 Significant atten-

tion has been paid to whether SRM evidence should be admitted in
products liability cases analyzed under strict liability theories. The
debate is carried out among academics and practitioners alike.5
The debate also sounds in the courts. In Federal courts, the
3.

2

JACK

B.

WEINSTEIN &

MARGARET

A.

BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL

Evi-

§ 407.03[3] [a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2000).
4. E.g., Margaret A. Berger, The FederalRules ofEvidence: Defining and Refining
the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 265-67 (1984).
5. E.g., Patricia A. Brass, FederalRule of Evidence 407: Should It Apply to Products
Liability?, 11 ToURO L. REV. 253 (1994); W.E. Brumby II, et al., Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in ProductLiability Actions: Recent Conflict in the Circuit Courts,
35 MERCER L. REV. 1389 (1984); Michele B. Colodney, Federal Rule of Evidence 407
as Applied to Products Liability: A Rule in Need of Remedial Measures, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 283 (1993); Thomas C. Fincham, FederalRule ofEvidence 407 and Its State Variations: The Courts Perform Some "Subsequent Remedial Measures" of Their Own in Products
Liability Cases, 49 UMKC L. REV. 338 (1981); Barbara Strong Goss, Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability: Later Opinions as Evidence of Defects in Earlier Reasoning, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 895 (1983); Roger C. Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving the Conflict by Recognizing the
Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 187 (1986); Joseph A. Hoffman & George D. Zuckerman, Tort Reform and Rules of Evidence: Saving
the Rule Excluding Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Actions, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 497
(1987); Matthew L. Kimball, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict
Liability Actions: Some Suggestions RegardingFederalRule of Evidence 407, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1415 (1982); Jeffrey C. Palkovitz, Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of
Subsequent Remedial Measures, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 671 (1981); Carol Proctor,
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures and ProductsLiability, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 857
(1984); John F. Renzulli, Strict ProductsLiability-Design Defect-Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 795 (1983); Faust F. Rossi, The Ban on
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures: Why Does it Survive?, 7 CORNELL L. FORUM 6
(1981); David E. Seidelson, The FederalRules of Evidence: A Few Surprises,12 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 453 (1984); Allen Tish & Davidson Ream, Does Rule 407 Apply to Strict Liability Actions?, 26 FOR THE DEFENSE, No. 10 at 5 (1984); Timothy J. Young, TortsProducts Liability -Subsequent Remedial Measures Admissible Under Allegations of Negligence and Strict Liability, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 188 (1983); Michael W. Blanton, Comment, Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in Strict Products Liability Cases: The
Evidence Weighs Against Automatic Exclusion, 65 UMKC L. REV. 49 (1996); Irene W.
Bruynes, Note, Strict Liability and the Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial
Measures UnderEvidence Rule 407, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 333 (1988); Randolph L. Burns,
Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict Products Liability: A New - Relevant Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1995);Joyce M. Cartun, Note, Admissibility of Remedial Measures Evidence in Products Liability Actions: Towards a Balancing
Test, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1171 (1988); Lev Dassin, Note, Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act: The Misapplicationof FederalRule of Evidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 736 (1990); Wendy Bugher Greenley, Note, FederalRule ofEvidence 407: New
Controversy Besets the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 30 VILL. L. REV.
1611 (1985); Thais L. Richardson, Comment, The Proposed Amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent Remedial Measure that Does Not Fix the Problem, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (1996); Eric L. Vinson, Note, Applying FederalRule of Evidence
DENCE

407 in Strict Liability: A Discussion of Changes to the Rule, 16 REV. LITIG. 773 (1997).
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debate came to a head when direct conflicts among the circuits led
to an amendment to the rule in 1997 that firmly established its ap6
plication to strict liability claims. Still though, differences among
the states and federal courts, as well as the narrow application of
the rule (to accidents occurring before and precipitating the SRM)
suggests it is an insignificant, even harmful, exclusionary rule
poised to do much more.
The current debates signal likely evolution in the coming decades. Efforts at tort reform and creation of a uniform national
standard are likely to gain favor, especially as the economy continues to blur geographical differences making jurisdictional differences all the more cumbersome. Short of a national standard,
changes are likely on a couple of fronts. First, incremental change
will likely occur as states adopt the new federal rule. Second, courts
will continue to grapple with forum shopping issues including
choice of law and Erie questions - this appears to be the most likely
issue to be addressed by the Supreme Court. Third, courts are
likely to create a rift as many give opposing interpretations of the
"event" which triggers exclusion. Conversely, incremental change
is not likely to occur to the list of exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. This is especially unfortunate because of the negative effect
the exceptions have on the rule's potential to make manufacturers
act responsibly. Thus one can safely anticipate significant conflict
and the increased cost of litigation that typically accompanies it.
Interestingly, there is a vacuum when one looks for hard evidence to support or refute different interpretations of the rule. On
a positive note, if the debate comes to a head, one can expect a
mustering of evidence to supplant the feelings that have largely
supported the dialogue to date. This article looks at the arguments
behind SRM rules and examines what the rules can and should do
in the coming decades.
II.

OVERVIEW

Part I presents an overview of the current status of SRM law in
6. Compare Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir.
1984) (excluding SRM evidence) with Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716
F.2d 1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 1983) (admitting SRM evidence). State courts have
also engaged in the debate. Compare Davis v. Int'l Harvester Co., 521 N.E.2d 1282,
1291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (excluding SRM evidence) with Ault v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Cal. 1974) (admitting SRM evidence) and Maietta v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 496 A.2d 286, 293 (Me. 1985) (admitting SRM evidence).
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state and federal jurisdictions and the SRM issues which confront
product manufacturers. Part II outlines the arguments that both
provide the underpinnings of SRM rules and serve to support interpretations of the rules. In Part III, the article demonstrates the
potential contained within SRM rules that may be tapped in the future. Part IV concludes that because of exceptions, non-uniformity,
and narrow application, current SRM law is a post hoc litigation artifice for clever lawyers to use to their client's advantage rather than
a uniform rule capable of generating reasonable and safe product
design decisions.
III. THE LAW

The text of various state rules vary slightly within fairly well defined parameters. However, the interpretations of the rules cover a
wide continuum. Section A presents the sources of the text of SRM
rules, and Section B presents the interpretations.
A.

Sources of the Rules

State and federal evidentiary rules and case law, or some combination of the two, address SRMs.
1.

Evidence Rules

There are four basic forms of SRM rules currently in force in
the U.S. The federal version expressly addresses products liability
and excludes SRM evidence. It provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would
have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product,
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.'
Several states used a similar rule prior to adoption of the new

7.

FED. R. EVID. 407 (2000).
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federal rule and thus language variations exist.'
A second form of rule uses the text from the old Federal Rule
407 that expressly excludes SRM evidence in negligence cases but is
silent as to strict products liability cases.9 For example, the old federal rule provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 0
The third form of rule expressly addresses products liability
and admits SRM evidence in those cases, though the evidence is
excluded in negligence cases." Hawaii's rule is representative. It
provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving dangerous defect in products liability cases, ownership, control, or feasibility or
precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeach2
ment.1
8.
1 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE
FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 17.2 (The Michie Pub. Co. 1987, Supp. 1992). For

example Nebraska's rule provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. Negligence or culpable conduct, as used in this rule, shall include, but not be limited to, the manufacture or
sale of a defective product.
NEB. R. EVID. 407 (emphasis added).
9. JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supranote 8, § 17.2.
10. FED. R. EVID. 407 (1996).
11. JOSEPH& SALTZBURG, supra note 8, § 17.2.
12. HAw. R. EVID. 407.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/24
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Finally, Rhode Island admits SRM evidence in products liability and negligence cases: '"When, after an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made the event less13likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is admissible.,
2.

Case Law

Some states have no formal evidence rule dealing with SRMs in
products liability cases.14 But most have addressed the SRM issue
through case law with a fairly even split between admission and exclusion. 5
B.

InterpretingEvidentiary And Case-basedSRM Rules

Despite the similarity of the words used in the rules, many different interpretations have grown from them. This phenomenon is
illustrated by the former federal rule. It is the single most used incarnation, yet there is great variation in the interpretation put on it
by the states adopting it.

Even the federal circuits did not agree

on a uniform interpretation. Indeed the Seventh and Tenth Circuits reached polar-opposite interpretations regarding the old Rule
407's application in products liability cases."
So a textual analysis of a rule is rarely enough to determine
how SRMs will be treated. Instead one must determine the view to
which a particular jurisdiction subscribes. There are three general
views.

13.

R.I. R. EVID. 407.

14.

Thomas S. Stewart & Stacy M. Andreas, Subsequent Remedial Measures: An

Analytical Model for Product Liability Cases, 26 ToRT & INS. L.J. 74, 92-96 (1990).
While the Stewart and Andreas article is a decade old it provides a good synopsis
of the 50 states' treatment of SRMs. Obviously changes have occurred, but it is beyond the scope of this article to survey the details.
15. Id. at 92-96.
16. Compare Davis v. Int'l Harvester Co., 521 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Il1. App. Ct.
1988) (adopting the old federal rule verbatim and excluding SRMs in products
liability cases) with Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., 648 P.2d 519, 525 (Wyo.
1982) (adopting the old federal rule 407 verbatim and admitting SRMs in products liability cases).
17. Compare Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331
(10th Cir. 1983) (admitting SRMs in products liability cases) with Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984) (excluding SRMs in
products liability cases).
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View That SRM Should Never Be Excluded

Since this position is contrary to common law, it has been
clearly stated in positive law. 8 The driving force behind this position appears to be based on relevance. In other words, jurisdictions
adopting it note the relevance of SRM evidence and leave its admission to the discretion of the trial judge.
2.

View That SRM Should Be Excluded Only In Negligence Actions.

This view is widely held.' 9 The plain language of both the former and current federal rule expressly provides for exclusion in
cases involving negligence. Excluding SRMs in negligence cases
has its origins in the common law.: °
The essence of this view is a recognition that negligence seeks
to place responsibility on the party at fault but that SRM evidence is
not indicative of fault and is highly prejudicial to that inquiry.2'
The argument continues; exclusion in strict products liability cases
is unnecessary because fault is not an issue there. Thus SRMs are
only excluded in negligence actions.
3. View That SRM Should Be Excluded In Both Negligence And
Strict Liability Actions
AboutS one
third of the states and all the federal circuits adhere
22
to this view. As noted, some states expressly incorporate this view
into their respective SRM rules. More typically, states rely on a
forced reading of the relevant evidence rule or a complete disregard of its language to get the rule to embrace this view.
For example, the former FED. R. EVID. 407 does not mention
strict liability, so reliance on that rule to exclude SRM evidence in
strict liability actions required an expansive reading of the text.
Some jurisdictions accomplish this expansion through the words

18.

JOSEPH & SALTZBURG,

19.

DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, 2 FederalEvidence 411-13

supra note 8, § 17.3.

(Revised ed., Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co. 1985, Supp. 1992).
20. Joseph & Saltzburg, supra note 8, § 17.3; Goss, supra note 4, at 906-12 (arguing that common law also supports exclusion in strict liability cases). See also,
Baron Bramwell's opinion in Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.N.S.
261, 263 (1869) explained infra in text accompanying notes 45-47.
21.

1 STEPHAN A. SALTZBURG, ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 571-

72 (7th ed., LEXIS Law Publishing 1998).
22. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 417-19; see also Stewart & Andreas,
supra note 14, at 92-96.
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"culpable conduct.""3 These jurisdictions argue that "culpable conduct" must be something more than negligence; otherwise inclusion of that phrase in the rule would be redundant. Thus "culpable
conduct" must contemplate strict liability.
Another expansive argument simply notes that exclusion in
strict products liability cases is not expressly, prohibited by typical
SRM rules, and that furthermore, the theory behind excluding
SRM evidence 24in negligence actions applies with equal force in
products cases.
The argument concludes that even though the
focus in a strict liability action is on defect not fault, SRM evidence
is still prejudicial and subject to abuse by juries, and therefore it
should be excluded.2 5
C. Issues ManufacturersMust ConsiderUnder Current SRM Law
Without question current SRM law creates incentives and disincentives. Just what they are and how they affect manufacturers'
decisions is not quite so obvious.
1. Defining A Subsequent Remedial Measure
The first problem a manufacturer must grapple with when
contemplating a product change is determining when a change is
an SRM. Not all changes are considered SRMs under the rules.
Both of the following examples describe a subsequent improvement, but only one is considered an SRM in mostjurisdictions.
Example 1. At TI,26 a manufacturer designs and produces several products. At T2 one of those products is involved in an accident. At T3, the manufacturer is made aware of the accident, and
in response to it, the manufacturer makes a design change. At T4,
the injured purchaser brings a products liability suit.
Example 2. At T1, a manufacturer designs and produces several products. At T2, through research and development, the
manufacturer discovers a safety enhancing innovation and implements it in a new generation of products. At T3,a first generation
product is involved in an accident. At T4, the injured purchaser

23. Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993) (understanding "culpable conduct" to include the creation of a product defect).
24. E.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir.
1984).
25. Id.
26. TI = a point in time, T2 = a subsequent point, etc.
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brings a products liability suit.
In both examples a change has been made subsequent to the
original design in response to some sort of testing of the product."
28
However, only Example 1 is widely considered an SRM. This conclusion arises from an interpretation of the "event" referenced in
most rules. The typical rule requires the remedial measure to be
taken after an event, and this event has largely been construed to
be an injury, as the federal rule now expressly provides. Thus, Example 2 is generally not treated as an SRM because the change was
made before the event.2
2.

Uniformity

Once a manufacturer decides if the change it is contemplating
is in fact an SRM, it must ascertain which interpretation of SRM law
will apply. As sections A and B imply, that determination can be
complex. It is, however, critical to the manufacturer's determination of expected liability (which is ultimately an element of the
product's price).
To determine expected liability for a given product, a manufacturer must anticipate which rules will apply in eventual lawsuits.
Consequently, it must determine the jurisdictions in which it will be
sued, and if different jurisdictions treat the same issues in different
ways then manufacturers must take account of all possible treatments and the likelihood of ending up in one jurisdiction versus

27. Testing in Example 1 is the accident that puts the manufacturer on notice
of a possible improvement needed in the product. Testing might also be research
and development which engineers a safer product.
28. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (expressly stating that the change must come after
the injury); Traylor, 988 F.2d at 733 (arguing that using the injury as the event is a
policy choice which balances the incentive for manufacturers to take SRMs against
permitting the finder of fact to consider probative evidence; pushing the event
back farther than the injury unfairly tips the balance in favor of the manufacturer); Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1987) (arguing that the incentive rational is weakened where no accident had yet occurred
so there was no need to exclude a product change implemented as a result of a
decision made independent of the accident); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938
F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that only remedial measures taken after an
"event" are excluded).
29. But see, Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 714 N.E.2d 556, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(excluding pre-injury change because "the same policy consideration, i.e., the potential chilling effect on safety improvements, [was] present in product liability
actions... regardless of whether the modifications were pre-injury or post-injury."
(quoting Smith v. Black & Decker, 650 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)).
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another. ° This is typically a complex and perhaps unworkable
problem. The end result of lack of uniformity is that the measurable incentive inherent in exclusion of the evidence is dulled.31
3.

Forum Shopping

Lack of uniformity encourages plaintiffs to sue in courts with
SRM admission rules. 2 Where SRM evidence is admissible, it is a
simple matter of having more favorable evidence to make a case.
4.

The Rule-based Exceptions

SRM evidence in cerMost SRM rules provide for admission •of
•
33
tain circumstances even if that evidence is generally excluded.
Some argue that the exceptions have swallowed the rule.34 Others
note that at a minimum much attention must be paid in answering
complaints and discovery
and formulating trial strategy so as not to
S 35
trigger the exceptions. To the extent the exceptions have become
the "rule," the view that SRMs should always be admitted prevails.
Thus, notwithstanding the language of a given rule, admission of
SRM evidence can be expected.
Cf Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1155 n.1 (Cal. 1974). also
30.
Goss, supra note 4, at 936-40 (noting the importance of uniformity where incentives are expected to induce certain behaviors); Karen A. DiLisio, The Admissibility
of Subsequent Remedial Measures in a Products Liability Case, 3 PROD. LIAB. L.J. 222,
239-40 (1992). To illustrate the general point consider the dilemma for one company-International Truck and Engine Corporation (f/k/a International Harvester) which is often involved in products liability suits. It was the defendant in
each of the following cases decided in 1985: Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d
573 (5th Cir. 1985); Bandstra v. Int'l Harvester Co., 367 N.W.2d 282 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1985); Maietta v. Int'l Harvester Co., 496 A.2d 286 (Me. 1985). In the Fifth
Circuit, SRM evidence was excluded in all actions. In Iowa, SRM evidence was excluded in negligence claims but not in products liability claims. In Maine, SRM
evidence was admitted in all actions (until a recent rule change which excluded
the evidence in all actions). This is a small yet telling example of the lack of uniformity - and continuing evolution - under current law.
31.
Goss, supra note 4, at 936-40 (noting the importance of uniformity where
incentives are expected to induce certain behaviors).
32. E.g., Daniel Ogburn, Subsequent Remedial Measures and the Application of
CaliforniaLaw in a Diversity Action, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 615 (1999).
33. FED. R. EVID. 407. "This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." Id.
34. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 1 MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 480 (1989).
35. STEWART & ANDREAS, supranote 14, at 81-83.
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IV. SRM EVIDENCE ADMISSION-ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON

The focus of this part shifts to the arguments that provide the
framework of SRM rules. These arguments are meant to illustrate
the bases of the conflicts in SRM law and to provide a backdrop
against which the analyses in Part III may be considered.
For every interpretation of SRM rules presented in Part I,
there is at least one argument in favor of it and one opposed. To
illustrate the great diversity of views, the arguments are presented
in point/counterpoint form-with the former favoring admission
and the latter favoring exclusion.
POINT: THE RELEVANCY ARGUMENT.

A true strict liability claim does not focus on the conduct of a
manufacturer; instead, the focus is on the product.' 6 The liability
question in products liability depends on' whether the product is
defective in design, manufacture, or warning. SRM evidence may
assist in answering the defect question," whether judged from a
consumer expectation or risk-utility standpoint, therefore it is rele38
vant.
COUNTERPOINT: THE TRUE LIABILITY RULE ARGUMENT

While it is true that nominally the standard in a products liability case is strict liability, in practice the standard is reasonableness, 9
and thus the same SRM rules should
apply in products liability
40
cases as apply in negligence cases. Examining the risk/utility of a
product, or some component of a product, is a surrogate for examining the manufacturer's exercise of due care. 4' A product is defec36. HENDERSON, supranote 4, at 197-201. See also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying
Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1983); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528
P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974) (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377
P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)).
37. Herndon,716 F.2d at 1328.
38. Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the evidence is relevant and only excluded as a policy choice). But see BuRNS,
supra note 4, at 1166-73.
39. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 323 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 1982) rev'd, 365 N.W.2d
176 (Mich. 1984) (stating, "[t]he risk-utility balancing test is merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus. As Dean Prosser has pointed
out, the liability of the manufacturer rests "upon a departure from proper standards of care, so that the tort is essentially a matter of negligence") (citing PROSSER,
TORTS (4h ed.) § 96). United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (CA
2, 1947).
40. See generally supra note 2, at 66-7 (noting the different strict liability theories involved in products liability and cautioning that SRM rules should apply
where those theories resemble negligence but probably not otherwise).
41. E.g., Prentis, supra note 39 at 444.
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tive or not on its own. Introducing a subsequent design as proof
that the prior design is defective does not assist the risk benefit
analysis. Rather it changes the liability question from "Was this design okay?" to "Was there a better design?"
POINT: THE IGNORANT MANUFACTURER ARGUMENT

The court in Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc.42 stated,
.there is no evidence which shows that manufacturers even know
about the evidentiary rule [FED. R. EVID. 407] or change their be-

havior because of it."" Incentive-based arguments are mere academic musings. Manufacturers do not make design decisions
based on them. Since SRM evidence is relevant to the case, it
should be admitted.
COUNTERPOINT: HOLMES' BAD MAN

Common sense alone sparks disbelief. After all, this is a far cry
from Holmes' Bad Man whose actions challenge the outer boundaries of the law. 4 It might instead be called Doyle's Lazy Person.4 5
Contrary to Judge Doyle's assertions, there is evidence of both
manufacturers' knowledge of SRM rules and anguish over SRM deThus the evidence suggests that
cisions in light of the rules.4

42. 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 1328.
44. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459-62
(1897).
45. Herndon, supranote 5 at 1324. The Honorable William E. Doyle wrote the
majority opinion in Herndon.
46. A number of articles have been written with manufacturers in mind. , e.g.,
Dorothy Dey, Subsequent Remedial Measures,25, FOR THE DEFENSE No. 7, 7-10 (1983);
Stephen L. Liebo, Products and Subsequent Remedial Measures, FOR THE DEFENSE No.
12 (1981); Allen Tish & Davidson Ream, Does Rule 407 Apply to Strict Liability Actions?, 26 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 10, 5-95 (1984). The Bureau of National Affairs
publishes a Corporate Practice Series including: Alvin G. Greenwald & Roy H.
Brisbois, Guide to Products Liability... A Practical Guide For The Corporate Counselor
(BNA 1987) (including advice on careful drafting of recall notices in light of SRM
rules). There is substantial reporting on proposed product liability bills including
SRM considerations: Michael Bradford, Tort Reform Proponents See Boost From
Bush Plan, Business Insurance (Feb. 17, 1992, Crain Communications, Inc.
NEXIS); Bipartisan Compromise Would Drop Caps From Senator Danforth's Bill,
Daily Report For Executives (Sept. 26, 1986, BNA, Inc., NEXIS); Eric Whisenhunt,
The Bucks Stop Where?, Michigan Business (Dec. 1986, Business Journal Pub. Co.
NEXIS). There is also reporting in the popular media: Daniel B. Moskowitz, Lack
of Uniformity in Rules of Evidence Hampers Companies, The Washington Post
(Final Edition), Oct. 19, 1992, at Fl (opening with an explanation of what a
manufacturer is faced with regarding the decision whether to make a SRM); Eleanor Randolph, Agonizing Self Criticism May Embarrass CBS, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Final Edition), Nov. 25, 1984, at A6 (describing the theory behind SRMs
and their involvement in the Westmoreland case); Jane Seaberry, court upholds
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manufacturers are rational actors not lazy spectators, so incentive-based SRM rules can and do influence manufacturers' behavior.
POINT: THE PLAIN LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

The plain language of most rules speaks of exclusion where
SRM evidence is offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
No mention is made of strict liability thus those actions are not
contemplated by the rules. 47 Finally, the lack of mention of strict
liability actions in the legislative history of most rules supports the
conclusion that those actions are not covered by the rules.
COUNTERPOINT: THE CULPABLE CONDUCT ARGUMENT

The words "culpable conduct" contemplate strict liability actions.4 9 Culpable conduct must be more than mere negligence.
Equating it with negligence attributes a sloppy and meaningless redundancy to the drafters of most SRM rules. Instead, culpable conduct includes strict products liability actions. Culpable conduct includes conduct that breaches a legal duty. Manufacturers have a
legal duty not to place unsafe products on the market. So if a
manufacturer places an unsafe product on the market, it is guilty of
culpable conduct. As such, SRM evidence in products liability actions should be excluded under the express provisions of most
rules that forbid use of evidence of culpable conduct.
POINT: THE BRAMWELL ARGUMENT
In Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co.50 , Baron Bramwell
observed:
People do not furnish evidence against themselves simply by

Evidence Curb in Ford Lawsuit, THE WASHINGTON POST (Final Edition), May 4,

1982, at D6 (describing the public policy behind SRM rules); Post-accident Design
Changes, Business Week (Industrial Edition), Oct. 5, 1981 at 132 (noting public
policy behind SRM rules). Finally, in an especially revealing article, counsel for
Piper aircraft discussed the frustrations of current SRM rules: Despite Setback,
Piper's Product Liability Experiment Continues? The Weekly of Business Aviation
(Vol. 48, No. 13, March 27, 1989; McGraw-Hill Inc.) (noting the economic incentive to delay SRMs, the possible crushing liability, and the general confused state
of SRM law).
47. Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974).
48.

FED. R. EvID. 407, Advisory Committee's Notes

49. Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1992); Flaminio
v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Ault, 528
P.2d at 1154-55 (Clark, J., dissenting). But see COLO. R. EviD. 407 Committee
Comment (noting that culpable conduct does not encompass strict liability actions); Wyo. R. EVID. 407 Committee Note (noting that culpable conduct does not
encompass strict liability actions).
50. 21 L.T.N.S. 261 (1869).
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adopting a new plan in order to prevent the recurrence of an accident. I think that a proposition to the contrary would be barbarous. It would be (as I have often had occasion to tell juries) to
hold that, because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it
was foolish before.5 1
Underlying Bramwell's statement is the notion that admitting
this evidence will discourage an individual from remedying or repairing a dangerous situation. By guaranteeing exclusion of the
evidence, the disincentive to correct the dangerous situation is removed and hopefully. the individual will make the repair. Bramwell
was addressing a classic negligence question, where a solitary accident was at issue.
COUNTERPOINT: THE BRAMWELL ARGUMENT REVISITED

A close reading of the Bramwell Argument supports exclusion
of SRM evidence in strict products liability actions as well.52 Based
on the assumption that a manufacturer learns from each new event
(including product accidents), it does in fact get wiser as it gets
older. This does not imply that it was dumb before or, in products
liability lingo, that its older designs become defective once newer
ones are developed. Holding a manufacturer liable for not knowing then, what it knows now (which is what admission of SRM evidence attempts) is precisely what Bramwell warned against.
POINT: CASE-BY-CASE BALANCING

SRM exclusion should be resolved on a case-by-case basis.5
Courts should use the balancing approach of FED. R. EVID. 403.
Courts would have greater flexibility to handle SRM evidence.
COUNTERPOINT: ONLY CLEAR RULES CREATE CLEAR INCENTIVES

Balancing undercuts any opportunity for creating a system of
incentives for manufacturers. If they do not know what will be excluded until trial then they cannot make decisions based on how
the change will be treated at trial. Furthermore this approach suffers from the same lack of uniformity problem plaguing the present
state of law. Finally, such an approach is contrary to the spirit if not
the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rules have already
recognized that SRM evidence is deserving of special treatment re51.

Id. at263

52. Flaminio,supra note 6 at 471.
53. CARTUN, supra note 5, at 1172-73; Brent R. Johnson, The Uncertain Fate of
Remedial Evidence: Victim of an Illogical Imposition of Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 191, 219-21 (1994).
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garding relevance. Like offers to compromise, plea agreements,
medical agreements, and liability insurance, SRMs have been singled out as rising above the baseline balancing of probative value
versus prejudicial effect. Case-by-case balancing is a step back in
the evolution of SRM law.54
POINT: THE AULT ARGUMENT

In Ault v. International Harvester Co., the California Supreme
Court held that public policy considerations which justify an SRM
exclusionary rule in negligence cases are not present in the products liability context. "The contemporary corporate mass producer
of goods..." is one who "...manufactures tens of thousands of units
of goods.. ., For this type of manufacturer, it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and
the attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because
evidence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an
action founded on strict 56liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement.
Manufacturers will not make manufacturing and redesign decisions based on possible exclusions. Therefore introduction of
SRM evidence will not dissuade them from making desirable improvements. Given the relevance of SRM evidence, it might just as
well be admitted in product liability trials.
ACTOR
ECONOMIC
COUNTERPOINT: THE RATIONAL
57
•

The analysis of Ault is incomplete, it fails to recognize and
appreciate the incentive scheme inherent in SRM rules. Manufacturers, large and small, make product decisions based upon what
will sell in the free market. Cost is a factor, and liability exposure is
54.

See generally, BURNS, supra note 5.

55. Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974).
56. Id.
57. Id. See also, Goss, supra note 5, at 931-32 (noting that the mass producer
argument assumes a defect in the product in question). A major shortcoming of
Ault is its lack of foundation for the conclusions reached. The only support states
that "[a] distributor would probably face greater total liability by allowing such defective products to remain on the market .. " See also Note, Products Liability and
Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKE L.J. 837, 849 (1972). The Ault court also
cites an Illinois case, Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 749
(Ill. App. Ct. 1972), as "direct support" for its conclusions, however while that case
reached the same conclusion, it did not use the same reasoning. Sutkowski instead
relied on the focus-on-the-product argument, and on the relevance of SRM evidence. Id. at 752. Even proponents criticize Ault for its limiting language. It expressly applies only to so-called "mass producers" causing some to question
whether the Ault conclusion should be applied to relatively smaller producers.
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a component of cost. Ault failed to recognize that a product
change may invite "innumerable additional lawsuits." Thus the potential for lawsuits must be considered as an additional cost of a
change rather than an unquestionable catalyst for change. Finally,
in these days of Clinton scandals and corporate apologies, negative
public image is short-lived at worst. This counterpoint is the focus
of the next section.
V. PROVING THE BENEFITS OF SRM EXCLUSION

A.

Assumptions

Some assumptions are based on the best available evidence.
Others are made to control for certain variables.
1. SRMs include all changes to a manufacturer's products,
whether they result from research and development or product accidents, made at any
time, without reference to any event such as a
58
product accident.

2. Admission of SRM evidence will increase the probability of
liability (P) for any given product.59
3. Manufacturers are capable of predicting the probability of
liability for a given product both where SRMs are admitted and

58.

LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, at 387 (suggesting that all changes

are indistinguishable vis a vis SRM rules and should therefore be treated the same
under those rules).
59. Bramwell recognized this in his classic justification for excluding SRMs in
negligence actions. supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. See also Tish, supra
note 4, at 5 (noting that introduction of SRM evidence clearly influences the outcome of products liability trials).
Victor J. Gold, Jury Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of Jury Inferential Error,59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 391, 391-92, 400 (1986). Gold argues that juries are error prone especially
where inferences are likely and that corrective instructions and the advocacy system are ill-equipped to meet the problem. The only guard against misconstruing
SRM evidence is an instruction from the court. While juries seem to be comfortable with this guard, it is probably a false comfort at best. There is reason to believe that this protection is inadequate, and that SRM evidence is in fact misused.
Id. Chief Justice Earl Warren conference on Advocacy in the United States, The
American Jury System: FinalReport, (Roscoe Pound American Trial Lawyers Foundation 1977) (recognizing lack of intellectual capacity of jurors including their inability to understand testimony, especially in products liability cases involving
medical, engineering, or scientific evidence). See also Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co.,
528 P.2d 1148, 1157 (Clark, J. dissenting). The dissent in Ault affirms the
pro-plaintiff value of SRM evidence. The first trial of that case ended in a hung
jury. At the second trial, plaintiffs counsel ".. included constant emphasis of the
subsequent change.. resulting in a plaintiffs verdict." Id. at 1157.
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where they are excluded.6 °
4. There are two types of SRMs: the design-change model and
the recall model. The design-change model, characterized by a
product change some amount of time after the product
S 61has been
on the market, represents the majority of SRM scenarios. The recall model is characterized by a change in and potential recall of a
product some time after it is first marketed. With this model, the
62
SRM actually changes products currently in use.
5. Manufacturers can predict the magnitude of losses (L).
6. Manufacturers anticipate the level of production of any
given product and take expected liability levels into account in
61
making production decisions in order to maximize profits.
7. Manufacturers are able to predict the costs (C) of SRMs and
will only take SRMs when they are profit-maximizing.

60. In most legal economic analysis literature probability of liability (P) is expressed as one number. To better illustrate the argument, this article isolates that
aspect of probability on which SRM decisions turn given the possibility of admission or exclusion. The traditional P is stated as a product of (Pa x Pj) where Pa is
the probability that an accident will happen and Pj is the probability that a manufacturer will be held liable-the probability of judgment. The Pj variable takes
into account all cases whether they go to trial or not. Thus both judgments and
settlements are included in the figure. While the argument presented here depends on jury misuse of SRM evidence, this does not imply that a case must go to
trial for the conclusion to hold. The threat ofjury misuse will strengthen a plaintiffs position so as to either force a trial or exact a higher settlement. Thus allowing admission of SRM evidence increases Pj whether a case goes to trial or results
in a settlement.
61. Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148. In Ault, the metal used to
manufacture a sport-utility vehicle's gearbox was changed after the plaintiffs vehicle was involved in an accident which involved a possible malfunctioning of the
gearbox. A survey of SRM cases suggests that the majority of cases fit the design-change scenario. Id.
62. An example of the recall model is found in Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961
F.2d 719, 719 (8th Cir. 1992). In Bizzle, the plaintiffs walking cane was recalled by
the defendant after (and at least in part because) the cane broke when the plaintiff fell. Ultimately all canes like the plaintiffs were removed from the market and
replaced with a different model. Id.
63. E.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of CorporateRationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 767 (1983) (noting how
exposure to liability affects manufacturer's behavior); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. &
Kathleen L. Blaner, The AntiCompetitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us At Our Own Game?, 9 J. L. COMM. 167, 185-186
(1989) (noting that businesses react to liability rules by inter alia dropping products and stopping research and development).
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B.

The Economic Analysis

1.

Simple Design-ChangeModel

The first illustration assumes two products (one built pre-SRM
and one built post-SRM) under the design-change model. It also
assumes that taking an SRM will not affect the probability of judgment. The analysis is displayed in Figure 1.
Fi ure 1 SRM Evidence Excluded
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In Figure 1, the data in rows I and Isrm are the analysis of expected costs for the products built before an SRM is taken. Both
rows appear the same under the design change model because the
contemplated SRM will not alter existing products,6 7 instead it will
change the design of new products. 68 The data in rows II and Ilsrm
represent those products built after contemplating the SRM. In
row II, the manufacturer chose not to implement the SRM. In row
Ilsrm, it was implemented.
In making the decision whether to take an SRM under the design-change model, a manufacturer must account for costs attributable to products built both before and after the contemplated
64. A manufacturer will calculate per product cost (PPC) by adding expected
liability and any additional care cost.
65. The total number of products built is represented by Nb and Na -where N
= number of products, b (before) = pre-SRM products, and a (after) = post-SRM
products.
66. A manufacturer calculates total cost (TC) both where a SRM is taken and
where no SRM is taken. The formulas are as follows. Where an SRM is not taken:

PPCI (Nb) + PPCII (Na) = TC. Where SRM is taken: PPClsrm (Nb) + PPCIIsrm (Na)
= TCsrm.

67. Existing products include those products manufactured
changed is incorporated.
68. New products include only those products yet to be built.
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SRM. As Figure 3 suggests, ceteris paribus, from a liability standpoint it would be profit maximizing to take the SRM because doing
so results in a net saving of 12. By taking care of 10, Pa is reduced
from .1 to .07 because the product is made safer (less likely to cause
injury) by the SRM, and Pj is reduced from .5 to .4 because with a
safer product proving a defect is more difficult The product of
these variables reduces P from .05 to .028 that in turn reduces PPC
and ultimately total costs. All of this benefit is attributable to the
SRM. In other words, efficiency is maximized by taking the SRM. 69
2. SRM Effect On Probability OfJudgment
This section changes one assumption, namely that taking an
SRM will increase the probability of judgment for the pre-SRM
product. This is expressed (in Figure 2) as an increase in Pj where
the SRM is taken (Isrm).
Fgure 2 SRM Evidence Admitted
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The analysis here is the same as in Figure 1, but the conclusions differ dramatically. Here the profit maximizing decision
would be to do nothing. Taking the SRM results in a net loss of 13.
If SRM evidence is admitted, there is a higher probability of judgment that in turn produces a higher expected liability and thus a
higher total cost.
This occurs despite the social desirability of the SRM. The social cost argument differs because society is concerned only with
the probability of accident (Pa). The probability of judgment (Pj)
is irrelevant since society will pay irrespective of an adjudication of
liability. Thus for the data contained in Figure 2, without the SRM
69. An efficient SRM is one that reduces total social costs. Not all SRMs are
efficient.
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the total social cost is 200, whereas when the SRM is taken, the total social cost is only 170. n Obviously social optimality favors taking
this SRM.
Since the manufacturer
can discount
• •).
• • its72expected liability (as
compared with society's expected liability) , its analysis will not
parallel society's analysis. Given the assumptions stated above, in
order to induce manufacturers to take all socially desirable SRMs,
SRM evidence must be excluded from trials of pre-SRM products.73
3. Multiple-ProductScenarios

This section challenges the conclusions of Ault.7 4 While maintaining the design-change model and the assumption that Pj is increased by admission of SRM evidence, this section assumes an increased number of pre- and post-SRM products to simulate the
mass producer of goods suggested by Ault. Figure 3 assumes 30,000
pre-SRM products and 10,000 post-SRM products. Figure 4 assumes 10,000 pre-SRM products and 30,000 post-SRM products.

70. That is Pa multiplied by the loss for products built both before and after
contemplating a SRM. Thus where there is one "before" product and one "after"
product, as in Figure 2, the calculation is this: [(.1 x 1000) + (.1 x 1000)] = 200.
71. The formula is the same as that noted above: [(.1 x 1000) + (.07 x 1000)]
= 170.

72. The discounting is achieved through inclusion in the cost calculation a
consideration of Pj. Any Pj less than one (1) will discount the manufacturer's
analysis relative to the social analysis.
73. This is true given the liability rule assumed in this article. Of course, if
another rule, such as manufacturer liability, prevailed, manufacturers would make
all efficient SRMs. Pj would be near one (1) thus the manufacturer's analysis of
efficient SRMs would parallel society's analysis. Further discussion of these
ramifications are beyond the scope of this article.
74. The previous section refutes the Ault conclusions as applied to a manufacturer that does not produce tens of thousands of goods.
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Figure 3 SRM Evidence Admitted-More Pre-SRM Products
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In Figure 3, if SRM evidence is admitted, the manufacturer will
not take the SRM. If instead SRM evidence is excluded, the conclusion suggested by Figure 1 would apply to the data in Figure 3.
The manufacturer would be induced to take the SRM because total
costs with the SRM are 1,880,000 compared with 2,000,000 when no
SRM is taken.
Fi ure 4 SRM Evidence Admitted-More Post-SRM Products
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Figure 4 suggests that when relatively more post-SRM products
are anticipated (as compared with existing pre-SRM products), the
manufacturer will take the SRM despite the risk that it will be admitted against it. This is perhaps the general idea (though not the
express claim) of the Ault argument.
There are a few general conclusions suggested by these two
figures. First, any time there are more products on the market before a contemplated SRM than what the manufacturer anticipates
building in the future, the manufacturer will not be induced to
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take an efficient SRM. This conclusion is implied by the combination of Figure 2, which shows that where there are equal numbers
of pre- and post-SRM products, manufacturers will not be induced
to take the SRM if SRM evidence is admitted and Figure 3, which
shows that relatively greater numbers of pre-SRM products will
magnify the number of cases where the incentive is to do nothing.
The same generalization cannot be made about the situation
portrayed in Figure 4. At first glance it may appear that a relatively
greater number of post-SRM products will induce the manufacturer
to take care. But as Figure 5 illustrates, there must be twice the
number of post-SRM products produced relative to pre-SRM products to induce the manufacturer to take care when SRM evidence is
admitted. 75 This suggests that for every SRM decision there is some
critical point at which manufacturing of enough post-SRM products
will offset the liability cost presented by existing pre-SRM products.
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re 5 SRM Evidence Admitted-Critical Point
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Total Products Nb = 10,000;

TOTAL COST

Na = 20,840
No SRM taken [50(10,000) + 50(20,840)]

1,542,000

SRM taken [75(10,000) + 38(20,840)]

1,541,920

Critically, under this scenario, the manufacturer's decision
adopting an SRM will coincide with volume production decisions.
If a manufacturer will not commit to a certain post-SRM volume,
the SRM will not be efficient. This critical point is the essence of
the difference between admitting and excluding SRM evidence.
Where an SRM is admitted, some absolute number of post-SRM
products must be built to make the SRM efficient. Under the assumptions stated above, where the SRM is admitted (Figure 5) a
manufacturer must build almost 21,000 post-SRM products to eco-

75. This does not suggest that post-SRM products must be double the number of pre-SRM products in every case. "Twice the number" is a function of the
assumptions used in this example, e.g., Pa, Pj, Loss, and Care.
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nomicallyjustify taking the SRM (i.e. reach the critical point).
Such is not the case where all SRM evidence is excluded. In
that case, the manufacturer must produce only 1 post-SRM product
to economically justify the SRM (See Figure 6).
Fi ure 6 SRM Evidence Excluded-Critical Point
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Total Products Nb = 10,000;

TOTAL COST

Na= 1
No SRM taken [50(10,000) + 50(1)

500,050

SRM taken [50(10,000) + 38(1)]

500,038

The conclusion suggested by Figures 5 and 6 is that only exclusion of SRMs can ensure that the maximum number of efficient
SRMs are taken. Where SRM evidence is excluded, efficient SRMs
will be taken independent of the existing number of pre-SRM
products or the projected number of post-SRM products. In contrast, where SRM evidence is admitted, the decision to implement
an SRM is a function of how many old products exist and how
many new products must be built to overcome losses. This conclusion directly contradicts Ault.
4. SRM Law Is Unclea/6
Up to this point the analyses have assumed that a manufacturer knows whether an SRM will be admitted against it. This assumption would hold if the manufacturer knew for certain where it
would be sued or if all jurisdictions used the same rule. This sec-

76. "Unclear" means that a manufacturer has difficulty determining which
jurisdictions it will be sued in and at what rate they will be sued in admitjurisdictions versus exclude-jurisdictions. First, the manufacturer would determine
the increased Pj for those jurisdictions where SRM evidence is admitted. Second, it
would have to take into account the number of cases expected to be filed in admit
jurisdictions (Pja) and the number expected to be filed in exclude jurisdictions(Pje) with some additional estimation for those jurisdictions where admission/exclusion is unclear (Pju) and ultimately combine these figures into a total Pj
(as expressed in Figure 7) .
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tion changes the assumption, assuming some jurisdictions admit
the evidence and some exclude it.
The analysis is presented in Figure 7. It is essentially the same
as Figure 2, except that Pj is lower than it would be if the manufacturer knew the SRM would be admitted in every case. In calculating
Pj, a manufacturer would average the number of cases where the
SRM will be admitted and those where it will be excluded. Figure 7
assumes that there are equal numbers of admit and exclude jurisdictions.
Fi ure 7 SRM Evidence Law Unclear
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TOTAL PRODUCTS NB = 1; NA = I

TOTAL COST

No SRM taken [50(l) + 50(l)]

100

SRM taken [62.5(1) + 38(1)]

100.5

While the total costs are closer here, the manufacturer will not
take this SRM despite its desirability (as shown in Figure 1). Here,
like the scenario where all SRM evidence is admitted, manufacturers take efficient SRMs in too few cases.
Furthermore, where admission is unclear, a manufacturer
must incur additional costs to make the complex averaging calculation. Because of this added cost, the manufacturer might well
forego the calculation and instead assume that all jurisdictions will
admit the SRM.17 In that case, the analysis would appear the same
as that in Figure 2.

77. The cost of calculating Pj would be an added cost of care which has the
effect of masking identification of truly efficient SRMs. By choosing to assume
that all jurisdictions will admit SRM evidence, the cost of the calculation is
avoided, but true cost is not identified. It is overestimated; thus again, efficiency is
not maximized.
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5. Simple Recall Model
The simplest decision whether to make a recall SRM is expressed in Figure 8. This example assumes one product. It illustrates that certain investments in care can minimize total costs by
reducing the probability of an accident and expected liability.
Figure 8 SRM Taken-Evidence Excluded
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The first row represents the product before the SRM. The
second row represents it after the SRM is taken. By taking care of
10, Pa is reduced from .1 to .07 because the product is made safer
by the SRM, and Pj is reduced from .5 to .4 because with a safer
product proving a defect is more difficult. This in turn reduces P
from .05 to .028. All of this benefit is attributable to the SRM.
6. Expanding The Recall Model
Figure 9 illustrates the analysis a manufacturer would make
where it has 5000 products on the market of which 400 have been
involved in accidents assuming all jurisdictions exclude SRM evidence. Figure 10 makes the same analysis assuming that the SRM
evidence is admissible in the cases of the 400 products where an accident already occurred. Finally, Figure 11 presents the analysis
where no SRM is taken.
Figure 9 SRM Taken -Evidence
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78. This is Pj times the loss (1000).
pened, Pa is irrelevant.
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Figure 10 SRM Taken-Evidence Admitted
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Figure 1 No SRM
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As these figures indicate, a manufacturer will be inclined to
take the SRM in fewer cases if SRM evidence is admitted compared
with where it is excluded.7 9 Figure 9 shows that the SRM is efficient, but where the SRM is admitted (Figure 10), the total cost to
the manufacturer is higher than if it does not take the SRM (Figure
11). The efficient result (Figure 9) is achieved only where the SRM
is excluded.
There must be a significant number of accident-products in
order for the conclusion to hold. s° It is a valid criticism that a
manufacturer would likely take action long before a large number
of accidents occurred, and in so doing, even where the SRM evidence is admitted, the more efficient choice would be to imple-

79. Compare Figure 10 with Figure 9.
80. Referring to Figure 10, if there are less than 338 accident products, the
manufacturer will make the SRM even where SRM evidence is admitted. For ex-

ample, where there are 337 accident products, the total cost is 429,944 which is
less than the total cost where no SRM is taken.
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ment the SRM. Significantly, however, efficiency is not maximized,
and as demonstrated, where SRM evidence is admitted there are
scenarios where manufacturers fail to take SRMs. It is also significant that, as is the case in the majority of jurisdictions, given that
the "event" is defined as a post-accident change, there is an incentive to delay the change until after accidents have occurred. 8' In
contrast, where SRM evidence is excluded, no such scenario exists.
Regardless of how few or how many accident products exist, a
manufacturer will always be induced to take SRMs.
7. SRM Law Is Unclear
The conclusion reached in Section 4 regarding unclear law
applies with equal force under the recall model. Assuming that
expected liability falls to 62.5 (as in Figure 7), the total cost where a
SRM is taken and evidence of it is admitted would be $424,800.82
While this is less than where no SRM is taken (Figure 11), it is still
higher than where SRM evidence is excluded (Figure 9). Thus,
where SRM law is unclear, only excluding SRM evidence will lead to
maximum efficiency.
VI. THE FUTURE OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
EXCLUSIONARY RULES

The current state of SRM law is a self-contradictory patchwork
of rules that create no uniform incentives. Reform of the law is
needed to establish the proper system of incentives. Reform
should focus on a creating an SRM rule that uniformly excludes all
evidence of changes occurring after production of the product in
question.
WHY EXCLUSION?

Socially efficient SRMs produce better, safer products, breed
more efficient and competitive manufacturers, and reduce total societal costs associated with product accidents. If an SRM is efficient
then it should be taken. Under current liability and evidence rules,
it is difficult, at best, to induce manufacturers to make all efficient
SRMs. Uniform SRM rules will induce manufacturers to take rela81. Perhaps, for example, the likelihood of injury is reduced by increased
awareness of danger spread through the media.
82. (400 x 625) + (4600 x 38) = 424,800.
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tively more or fewer SRMs. As demonstrated in Part III, where SRM
evidence is excluded manufacturers are induced to take all socially efficient SRMs. The analyses presented above show that excluding all SRM evidence creates the strongest incentives to make
SRMs by minimizing total costs. Therefore, SRM evidence should
be uniformly excluded to ensure the best possible environment of
incentives to make safer products.
WHYA UNIFORM SRM RULE?

The key to getting manufacturers to take SRMs is to create the
incentives noted. As illustrated in Figure 7, where SRM rules vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction manufacturers will take care in
fewer cases than they would where all SRM evidence is excluded,84
possibly to the same extent expected where SRM evidence is introduced by all jurisdictions. In general, a lack of uniformity dilutes
the incentives created by some jurisdictions. Only exclusion of
SRM evidence by all jurisdictions ensures an undiluted incentive to
take all efficient SRMs. Thus, any new SRM rule should apply uniformly to all products liability cases regardless of the jurisdiction.
WHAT ABOUT EXCEPTIONS?

Exceptions to SRM rules dilute incentives in the same manner
as lack of uniformity. If manufacturers interpret exceptions as
likely to apply in more cases than not, they will treat the exception
as the rule. Once this occurs, the incentives are lost, and relatively
fewer efficient SRMs will be taken. Therefore to ensure the strongest possible system of incentives, there should be no exceptions allowed to the exclusion of SRM evidence. 85
WHAT ABOUT A NARROW DEFINITION OF SRMs?

Current law only considers a product-change as an SRM if the
change is made in response to an accident. Product-changes arising from innovation or research and development are not SRMs
83. Figures 1, 6, 8, and 9.
84. Compare Figure 1 with Figure 7.
85. There is some merit to the argument that SRM evidence should be allowed to prove feasibility if controverted. This article takes no position on that

view.
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and evidence of those changes is generally admissible. Ceteris
paribus, manufacturers will make fewer of these non-SRM efficient
changes if evidence of these changes is admitted (Figure 2) compared to where evidence of these changes are excluded (Figure 1).
Thus, like the problems of uniformity and exceptions, narrowly defining SRMs dilutes the system of incentives.
These product changes, in terms of creating better, safer
products, breeding more efficient and competitive manufacturers,
and reducing total societal costs associated with product accidents,
cannot be distinguished from changes which current SRM law is
willing to exclude. Furthermore, this type of product change likely
represents a larger group of potential changes than that group currently defined as SRMs. As such, this non-SRM-change-group as a
whole influences manufacturers' decisions more strongly than the
relatively smaller SRM-change-group. In order to create the incentive to make non-SRM changes, they should be treated like SRM
changes. Thus, evidence of these changes should also be excluded.
WHAT

ABOUT THE RELEVANCY ARGUMENT?

The evidence is not truly relevant. Even if one concedes the
relevance of SRM evidence, there is still reason to exclude it. Admitting the evidence serves one plaintiff. He is assisted in proving
his case with this one additional piece of evidence. But as the
analyses suggest, the community of manufacturers will react to this
treatment by taking comparatively fewer SRMs. The net result is an
environment of comparatively less-safe products.
If instead the SRM evidence is excluded, total societal benefit
is increased. As the analyses demonstrated, manufacturers will take
comparatively more efficient SRMs where SRM evidence is excluded. This translates into an overall safer environment.
OTHER POSSIBLE BENEFITS?
The incentives to reduce costs offered by excluding SRM evidence suggest that manufacturers will keep close watch on product
accidents. The sooner a liability reducing modification is recognized, the sooner it can be implemented and have a cost (of liability) cutting effect.

Exclusion is also cheaper than a rule that admits SRM evidence. Under an admission regime, courts must hear more evi-
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dence; judges must warn juries against misuse; and litigants must
argue over the interpretations of SRMs. This costs time and money
for both courts and litigants.
VII. CONCLUSION

SRM law presently exists as a confusing array of sometimes contradictory incentives. The near future likely holds more of the
same for SRM law, incremental change and case law interpreting
the ambiguous phrases that will continue the lack of uniformity
that prevails today. Hopefully there will be strides towards mustering hard evidence to support or refute the prevailing arguments.
There are at least even odds that the opportunity for sweeping
changes could be made to products liability law on a national scale.
If so, evidence exists that manufacturers are rational economic actors that are aware of the law and make decisions in light of it.
Thus, the potential for encouraging product improvements is ripe
for exploitation. A uniform rule of exclusion which contemplates
all product changes and which is not subject to exception will induce manufacturers to take the greatest number of efficient product improvements. At the dawn of a new century, SRM law is
poised for a sweeping change.
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